Williams develops his defense of Lewis's argument from desire in five parts. First he lays out what he calls "the prima facie case" for taking the experience of Joy at face value. Then he sets forth four different versions of the argument from desire, suggesting that each provides some unspecified (but substantial?) degree of support for theism. Let us begin with the prima facie argument.
Williams claims that there is an initial presumption in favor of treating Joy as a reliable pointer to God, and thus that the burden of proof lies on the skeptic to prove otherwise. This is supposed to follow from Richard Swinburne's so-called principle of credulity. According to Swinburne, it is a basic principle of rationality that we ought to believe that things are as they seem to be unless we have positive reason for thinking that we are mistaken (Swinburne, 1979, pp. 254-271) . Since Joy seems to point to a transcendent object of fulfillment, we should believe that such an object exists unless we have adequate evidence that such an object does not exist. Presumably, Williams calls this a "prima facie" argument from desire because it does not claim that Joy provides convincing evidence for the existence of God. Rather, it claims only that the burden of proof lies on the doubter to show that Joy is not what it appears.
Two things should be said about this argument. First, it is not clear that the principle of credulity is true. Skeptics of various stripes would deny it. So, too, would devotees of religions such as Hinduism and some strands of Buddhism, who hold that phenomenal reality is maya, or illusion. But even if the principle of credulity is true, it cannot be invoked to support the argument from desire. As Swinburne notes, the principle of credulity applies only to "perceptual claims" (Swinburne, 1979, p. 260) . What it claims is that "what one seems to perceive is probably so" (Swinburne, 1979, p. 254; emphasis added). As we shall see, what Lewis calls Joy is a certain kind of desire or emotion, not a perceptual experience. With Joy there is no apparent perception of God or Heaven, merely an emotionally-charged longing for what Lewis calls an "unnameable something" (Lewis, 1958, p. 9) . Indeed, it is a defining feature of Joy that it has no clear or determinate object, but is easily confused with "false Florimels," that is, delusive objects (Lewis, 1958, p. 8) . If Joy is, in some secondary or extended sense, a perceptual experience, it is not an experience of a Being who "probably is" as "He seems." Lewis would not claim that we have anything like an adequate grasp of God's nature or essence. Our experience of God is of what Rudolf Otto called a tremendum mysterium (Lewis, 2001a, pp. 5-10) . For these reasons, Swinburne's principle of credulity does not support Williams's view.
